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História

Myanmar: Thirteen telecom providers and partners accused of deploying junta surveillance tools from Geedge Network; incl. cos. non-responses

The report titled “Silk Road of Surveillance” released on 9 September 2025 by Justice For Myanmar draws on a large leaked dataset, alleging that China’s Geedge Networks and 13 Myanmar telecom service providers have helped the junta in building a centralised censorship system and real-time surveillance over some 33.4 million users. The dataset describes Geedge’s Tiangou Secure Gateway (TSG) installed across 26 data centres and centrally managed by the junta’s National Cyber Security Center under the Ministry of Transport and Communications.

According to Justice For Myanmar, Geedge provided hardware, software, training, on-site engineers, and long-term support, enabling individual-level traffic tracking and cell-ID geolocation used to find, arrest, torture, and kill journalists, activists, and resistance members—potentially amounting to aiding and abetting crimes against humanity; it urges targeted sanctions on the firm and investigations of responsible executives.

Justice for Myanmar highlighted the role 13 telecom operators which hosted Geedge’s infrastructure in their data centres, thereby facilitating mass censorship and surveillance: Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT); Mytel; ATOM (formerly Telenor Myanmar); Ooredoo Myanmar (now under Nine Communications); Frontiir (Myanmar Net); Campana Mythic; StreamNet; Golden TMH Telecom; Internet Maekhong Network (IM-Net); Myanmar Broadband Telecom (MBT); Myanmar Telecommunication Network (MTN); Global Technology Group (GlobalNet); and China Unicom. International investors and partners were mentioned, and called for investigations.

Business & Human Rights Centre reached out to Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications, Telecom International Myanmar (Mytel), Nine Communications, StreamNet, Golden TMH Telecom, Myanmar Broadband Telecom, Global Technology, Myanmar Telecommunication Network, Internet Maekhong Network, Cognyte Software, Mascots Group, Geedge Networks, China Unicom, Qianxun Spatial Intelligence, NORINCO and China Asean Information Harbor Co., Ltd for response. They did not respond.

Respostas da empresa

Cognyte Software Ltd

Sem resposta

Myanma Posts and Telecommunications

Sem resposta

Mytel

Sem resposta

Nine Communications (Ooredoo Myanmar)

Sem resposta

StreamNet

Sem resposta

Golden TMH Telecom

Sem resposta

Myanmar Broadband Telecom

Sem resposta

Global Technology (GlobalNet)

Sem resposta

Myanmar Telecommunication Network

Sem resposta

Internet Maekhong Network

Sem resposta

Cognyte Software Ltd

Sem resposta

Mascots Technologies

Sem resposta

China North Industries (NORINCO)

Sem resposta

Qianxun Spatial Intelligence Inc

Sem resposta

China Asean Information Harbor Co Ltd

Sem resposta

China Unicom

Sem resposta

Geedge Networks

Sem resposta

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